An employer-employee panel is used to study whether the movement of workers across firms is a channel of unintended diffusion of R&D-generated knowledge. Somewhat surprisingly, hiring workers from others' R&D labs to one's own does not seem to be a significant spillover channel. Hiring workers previously in R&D to one's non-R&D activities, however, boosts both productivity and profitability. This is interpreted as evidence that these workers transmit knowledge that can be readily copied and implemented without much additional R&D effort.
Introduction
While it is commonly agreed that R&D generates positive externalities, because of rent and knowledge spillovers (for reviews see, e.g., Griliches, 1992; Mohnen, 1996) , little is known about the channels of transmission through which they operate. Rent spillovers are most likely to occur via the trade of intermediate inputs and capital goods. Knowledge spillovers occur when information gets exchanged in a tacit or codified way when people meet, interact, trade, or cooperate, and is often measured by a proximity measure between emitter and receiver on the grounds that knowledge spillovers are more likely to happen when the two parties are similar and physically close to each other. Many proximity measures have been proposed, but very few studies are able to trace how spillovers actually make their way from one firm to the other. Following Arrow's (1962, p. 615 ) lead, it is nevertheless frequently suggested (see, e.g., Geroski, 1995; Stephan, 1996) that labor mobility -the movement of workers from one organization to another -is among the key transmission mechanisms of knowledge spillovers. Upon defining an agenda for future research (in the context of their critical survey of the literature on geographically localized knowledge spillovers), Breschi and Lissoni (2001, p. 1000) state that "The first entry in the agenda is the labour market… A crucial mechanism through which knowledge diffuses locally is the mobility of technologists and scientists, either across firms, and between firms and academic institutions." This paper addresses the issue empirically by studying whether inter-firm labor mobility is a channel of knowledge spillovers, and whether they affect business performance. To this end a comprehensive longitudinal employer-employee panel dataset, available for research purposes at the Research Laboratory of Statistics Finland, is exploited. 1 In our terminology knowledge spillovers occur when a firm's R&D project discloses new information that is useful to another firm in its R&D efforts, and the emitting firm is not fully compensated for the input. We make every effort to explicitly identify and isolate one potential channel of knowledge spillovers, namely inter-firm labor mobility. We device a setting where the potential spillovers may also be internalized by the labor market and where other factors possibly contributing to business performance are controlled for and 6 other potential sources of bias are eliminated. Empirically we resort to long differences in studying firm-level profitability growth, and to an extent also productivity and average wage growth, with the shares of various types of hired, staying, and separating workers among the key variables of interest.
To anticipate our conclusions, we find that knowledge spillovers may be partly but are not fully internalized by the labor market. Thus, knowledge spillovers exist, albeit not necessarily of the most obvious type. Perhaps surprisingly, hiring workers from others' R&D labs to one's own does not seem to be a statistically significant spillover channel, even if we find weak support for it. Hiring workers previously in R&D to one's non-R&D activities, however, clearly boosts both productivity and profitability. This is interpreted as evidence that these workers transmit knowledge that can be readily copied and implemented without much additional R&D effort. Our paper makes a contribution to the scarce literature that explicitly studies how spillovers come about and how they are being transmitted.
Section 2 briefly reviews the previous literature on the topic. The model to be estimated is derived in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the employed data and its properties. Section 5 presents the baseline results, the robustness of which is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
LITERATURE
This section reviews the theoretical and empirical studies that explicitly consider inter-firm labor mobility as a channel of knowledge spillovers. Cooper (2001) sets up a theoretical two-period competitive industry model, where labor mobility is the vehicle diffusing knowledge from one firm to another, and where R&D and labor mobility are determined endogenously. The model emphasizes the duplicative nature of R&D; both the previous and the current employer of a job switcher utilize the same knowledge simultaneously. It is shown that higher mobility does not necessarily reduce R&D investment and that it generally promotes productivity growth. Due to the opposing external effects of emitting and absorbing spillovers, an efficient labor mobility outcome can be reached despite apparent incentive problems. Fosfuri and Rønde (2004) present a gametheoretic model of labor mobility with a particular emphasis on cumulative innovations. In their model a firm hires a researcher to conduct R&D, which gives rise to knowledge 7 valuable for both direct commercialization (first generation) and as a basis for further innovations (second generation). After a first generation success a researcher can move to a rival and use the previous employer's knowledge to come up with a second generation innovation. As workers are mobile, especially within their current region, firms' have a choice of either clustering with or isolating themselves from other firms with consequences on industry-level knowledge spillovers. It is found that firms' incentives to cluster are the strongest when (1) the value of the second generation is high relative to the first (high benefits of hiring from rivals), (2) competition in the product market is soft (loosing workers to rivals does not have severe end-market effects), and (3) the probability of a single firm developing an innovation is relatively low. In industries where clustering is driven by spillovers, both labor mobility and wages of skilled workers are high. Kim and Marschke (2005) model the effects of scientists' mobility on firms' R&D and patenting decisions. They emphasize the role of patenting in protecting firms' intellectual assets from (former) employees. The threat of an employee departing from a firm has two effects: it reduces the firm's R&D expenditures, as a scientist is willing to indirectly pay (by accepting a lower wage) for the possible external return on the knowledge acquired through R&D, and it raises the propensity to patent, as the firm protects itself against the possibility of departing employees. The empirical findings with firm-level panel data confirm the latter result.
Scientists' mobility is associated with variations in cross-industry and increases in economywide patenting. Franco and Filson (2006) device a model in which knowledge diffuses when employees are able to imitate their employer's technology. The former employees may use it to create competing firms (spin-outs). Employers adjust current wages downward to reflect the value of imitating until a Pareto optimal equilibrium is reached. In the competitive equilibrium mobility nevertheless remains socially suboptimal. More advanced parent firms are more likely to spawn spin-outs. The model's implications are found to hold in the rigid disk drive industry. Combes and Duranton (2006) study the trade-offs in clustering with a rival firm in a game of two firms with differentiated products. They focus on the intensity of competition in both the product and the labor markets. A continuum of workers and reciprocal labor mobility are among the key features of their model. It is assumed that labor and knowledge flows coincide. It is found that generally firms choose to co-locate. As competition intensifies, labor flows are reduced as firms raise the wages of their most 8 strategic workers thereby increasing the costs (wages) and lowering the benefits (knowledge flows) of co-location. When conditions of perfect competitions are approached, firms choose to separate. Firms' productivity and its growth is predicted to increase with equilibrium labor mobility.
On the empirical side, Almeida and Kogut (1999) study inter-firm mobility of major patent holders. They find that mobility of scientists indeed influences local transfer of knowledge. In certain cases (particularly Silicon Valley) knowledge seems to be geographically localized and embedded in regional labor networks. Power and Lundmark (2004) suggest that, rather than flowing in-the-air or being exchanged via informal and accidental encounters, knowledge is developed and diffused through work-related interactions. Thus, labor mobility is among the most likely ways of knowledge transfer. It may work through three major channels: by speeding up knowledge dissemination and learning processes, by creating new combinations of knowledge embodied in people, as well as by bonding and linking firms, workplaces, and institutions. The issue is studied with individual-level panel data of the ICT concentration in the Stockholm region. Individuals specializing into particular sub-sectors have higher mobility rates. There is indirect evidence that the observed relatively high mobility rate within the ICT sector promotes industrial concentration and firm performance. Møen (2005) studies the mobility of technical staff as a channel of R&D spillovers using employer-employee data in 1986-95 covering roughly 30,000 workers in 750 plants in the Norwegian machinery and equipment industry. He insists that R&D, the primary and specific purpose of which is to come up with new product and process ideas (inventions) and designs, is also a learning process for those involved. Thus, while the firm's decision to invest in R&D is motivated by potential future profits, due to appropriability problems an employee might earn returns on the firm's investment. Møen's key proposition -stemming from the classical human capital theory (Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1958) -is that to the extent that employees receive on-the-job training, they should be willing to pay for it in anticipation of higher wages in the future. He constructs and estimates various wage models with R&D-related experience profiles among the key variables of interest. It is indeed found that technical staff in R&D-intensive firms have lower wages early in their careers and later earn returns on their implicit investment in the form of higher wages. "These findings suggest that the potential externalities associated with labor mobility, 9 at least to some extent, are internalized in the labor market." (Møen, 2005 , p. 83). Magnani (2006 replicates and extends Møen's (2005) investigation with a panel of US manufacturing workers and two-digit industry-level R&D intensities. Magnani's results provide some support to Møen's findings: also in the US there seems to be a R&D-induced steepening of the wage profile; there is, however, little evidence for an earnings drop in R&D-intensive industries at early stages of one's career. As pointed out by the author, the latter (non-)finding might be driven by the use of industry-level R&D, as opposed to the firm-level R&D data used by Møen. Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer (2006) consider inter-firm labor mobility as a possible source of agglomeration economies with a panel of college-educated male employees in twenty US metropolitan areas with computer industry agglomerations.
The findings suggest that high mobility in the computer industry facilitates reallocation of resources in the Silicon Valley. As compared to other locations in the US, mobility and related agglomeration economies seem to be more pronounced in California, where a state law makes non-compete agreements unenforceable. The heightened mobility is not to be found in other Californian industries, lending support to the authors' hypothesis that the external economies of scale are particularly important in industries with modular innovation.
MODEL
Our model employs a variant of a micro-level productivity decomposition method (cf. Maliranta, 2005, 2007) . 2 With linked employer-employee data it is possible to study the profitability, productivity, and wage effects of hired, staying, and separating workers by their type. Maliranta (2005, 2007) focus on the role of age. The proposed extension tracks the nature of the employees' job assignments -whether in R&D or non-R&D tasks -before and after a job change. A firm's labor force consists of different worker groups 1,..., j M = . The firm's output (value added) in period 1 is defined as the sum of the outputs of the worker groups (defined by, e.g., age, education, and/or employee tenure):
The firm's labor productivity is the labor share weighted average of the groups' labor productivities:
Each worker group can further be divided into two subgroups: workers who were employed by the firm at the previous period 0 , i.e., staying workers (stay), and those who were not, i.e., hired workers (hire). Thus, the firm's labor productivity becomes
Because the labor shares must add up to one
after some manipulations (as shown in the appendix), equation (3) can be re-written as follows:
) ( 
where
In period 0 we have to separate out the workers who will remain with the firm in period 1 and those who will not, i.e., the separating workers (sepa). Noting that 
By definition the staying workers in period 0 and in period 1 are the same individuals. Assuming that they are in the same group, we have:
The difference of period 0 and 1 productivity levels is
Slight manipulation yields 
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (10) captures the firm's labor productivity change attributable to the staying workers. It is the labor share weighted average of the productivity changes across worker groups. It may be interpreted as productivity growth due to the accumulation of human capital through experience. These workers may have such human capital that enables them to adopt or come up with more productive techniques, i.e., these workers may have dynamic long-run effects on the firm's productivity. 3 The second term on the right-hand side of Equation (10) captures the firm's labor productivity change attributable to hiring new workers. Hiring workers in group j boosts productivity, if the hires have on average a higher productivity level than the stayers in period 1. New hires may be more productive, e.g., due to skills, competences, and knowledge acquired in previous employment. Hiring-related adjustment costs are implicitly included, i.e., the new hires relative productivity is net of adjustment costs.
Finally, the third term on the right-hand side of Equation (10) captures the firm's labor productivity change attributable to separating workers. Separating workers in group j boosts productivity, if they have a lower productivity level than the average stayer in period 0 .
We parameterize productivity of hired, separated, and staying workers assuming them to be constant within worker groups. Other differences across firms are captured by the variables contained in vector Z . The remaining unexplained deviations ε are considered white noise.
Besides labor productivity, a similar decomposition can be used for the firm's average wage level by simply substituting W for Y . Thus, the following equations can be specified:
where ( ) ( ) ( )
⎦ are the average productivity and wage levels,
are the hiring and separating rates, and
L is the share of staying workers.
The labor productivity effects of hiring and separating workers in group j is thus
Intercept α indicates the growth rate in the reference group of stayers. Thus, ( / ), ,
indicates the growth rate difference between group j and the reference group.
Firms are ultimately interested in profitability, which for the present purposes is defined as follows (see Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2007) :
where OPM denotes the operating margin
+ , where a is the ratio of payroll taxes to wages assumed to be constant over time and across worker groups. 4 The growth rate of profitability is thus simply the difference between the growth rates of productivity and wages, which is approximated by
We then obtain the profitability equation
where, on the basis of (14), the following approximations hold
13
and
we can write ( ) 
which shows that the parameter of the hiring variable for the worker group j in the profit equation (14) can be interpreted as a measure of the profitability level of the hired group j workers relative to all stayers in period 1.
Analogously, we obtain that
which provides us a measure of the relative profitability level of the separated group j workers before they leave.
There are three main sources of bias when analyzing firm performance and labor characteristics empirically. First, there may be unobservable firm heterogeneity both in productivity and wage levels, which is correlated with the firms' choice of labor input. For example, the firm vintage and worker cohorts tend to be tied together, with young workers being employed in firms that have new equipment and high productivity levels. Since we are using growth rates as the dependent variables, this is not an issue of great concern here. That is, if there is an unobserved firm-specific time-invariant component in the productivity or average wage level, it is eliminated in the rates of change. Our approach is related to the use of long differences (see, e.g., Griliches and Mairesse, 1998) ; we define the growth rates and labor flows in a five-year window. We also control for some observable firm characteristics, included in Z (see below).
14 Second, there is heterogeneity across workers. This would not be an issue if the firms randomly chose new employees from the pool of applicants or randomly picked up those who are laid off. This is not likely to be the case, however, since the firms attempt to hire the best and lay-off the poorest performers. The hiring and separating flows may therefore be unrepresentative with respect to the corresponding groups in the whole population.
However, since the selection bias is likely to affect the productivity and wage growth rates in the same way (see Hellerstein and Neumark, 2004) , it should at least be eliminated when examining their difference, i.e. the growth rate in profitability.
Third, the hiring and separation rates are based on the firms' decisions and are thus possibly correlated with the error term. This simultaneity problem may be most pronounced for inputs that are most adjustable (Marschak and Andrews, 1944) . For example, positive technology shock may lead to the hiring of new, young workers, which then causes an overestimate of their productivity effect (cf. Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Olley and Pakes, 1996 all those having at least a bachelor's or equivalent degree), the tenure of the workers in the firm (either Short or Long ten., those that in the initial period had been with the firm 5 years or less being defined as having Short tenure), the previous job assignment (having been employed elsewhere either in R&D or in Other (non-R&D) activities, as well as the current job assignment (being employed in the firm either in R&D or in Other activities). 9
R&D workers are defined as those in the group of "senior officials and employees in research and planning". 10 As shown in 
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Start-& end-year log-diff. of the (physical) capital/labor ratio As the model derived in the previous section suggests, the hiring variables are defined as shares of end-year total employment, the staying variables as shares of continued employment, 12 and the separating variables as shares of start-year employment. The worker groups are mutually exclusive: thus, the hiring variables add up to the overall hiring rate, the staying variables add up to one, and the separating variables add up to the overall separation rate.
Four variables in Table 1 firms' R&D, they should show up in these four variables. The argument is that to the extent that wages do not fully reflect personal productivities of respective workers, acknowledging the fact that s/he comes from another firm's R&D lab should capture the possible transfer of the knowledge accumulated via the stream of the other firm's R&D investments. Thus, these variables should capture the equivalent of 'stealing blueprints' upon leaving for a new job, although it is by no means necessary (or common to our understanding) that such spillover should ever take illegal or immoral forms.
Besides considering the issue separately for younger and older workers, also note that the personnel previously engaged in R&D is also split into those having new assignments in either R&D or other activities. While both of these groups can potentially spill over the R&D-generated knowledge of previous employers, arguably the transferred knowledge may be of a different type: it seems plausible that a former R&D engineer is hired to non-R&D activities, because the spilloverable knowledge s/he possesses can be implemented so readily that it is unnecessary to funnel it through the receiving firm's R&D lab. Knowledge being channeled through the lab (by rather having a job assignment there) might be also relevant, but perhaps not as readily implementable upon being hired. Even if time-invariant firm effects are removed by construction from the dependent variables when considering growth rates, we include a fairly extensive set of controls in order to capture possible differences in dynamics across time. Industry dummies (NACE rev.
1 two-digit industries, 41 in all) account for the effects of idiosyncratic industry shocks; likewise a set of dummies controls for the possible regional effects (NUTS two-digit regions, 20 in all). The (log of) age of the firm is controlled for. A dummy captures the firm's exposure to foreign ownership. A dummy indicating that the firm has multiple establishments is also included. Changes in capital structure are controlled for by the log-difference of the startand end-year physical capital intensity. In order to capture the possible catching-up or life cycle effects in productivity dynamics, the start-year levels of labor productivity and average wage are also included as controls. 14 Observations are lost from our sample for various reasons. Our approach dictates that we must focus on those firms that appear in both the initial and the end year. 15 In addition,
we have required that at least 10 persons can be linked to the firm in both years. Some observations are dropped from the analysis due to missing information. 16 Before conducting the econometric analysis we leave out some potentially erroneous observations that might distort our results. First, we remove those observations where the number of linked employees differs by more than 10% from the number of employees in the company data, as this indicates that the linking of the individual and firm data is incomplete.
Second, we remove some potentially influential outliers that we identified by using the method proposed by Hadi (1992 Hadi ( , 1994 . 17 In the baseline estimations we include firms that employ at least 20 persons. The main reason for leaving the smaller firms out is that the employment numbers of them are sometimes imputed on the basis of wages, which could badly distort the analysis in our setting.
Finally we are left with an estimation sample of 1,339 firms (with some 200,000 employees) for our baseline estimation. The sample covers about one third of the corresponding population of firms and persons. Table 3 presents White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the model derived in Section 3. These are our baseline results that are estimated with weighting by firm size (the average of the initial and the last year's employment). A 21 justification for using weighting comes from the fact that we are interested in the profitability and productivity effects of the employment flows. Unweighted estimation gives equal weight to large firms with low flow rates and small firms that have high flow rates but account for a small share of employment. Another justification for using employment weights is that the errors are likely to be heteroscedastic in a way that standard deviations are inversely proportional to firm size (Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2005) . The left-most column shows the regression with the profitability growth as the dependent variable and thus provides our core set of results. The middle column shows a regression with the labor productivity growth as the dependent variable. 19 The right-most column shows a regression with the average wage growth as the dependent variable. Note that for many independent variables the left-most column is the difference between the middle and the right-most column, although the correspondence is just approximate.
We first briefly comment on the variables other than those related to labor mobility: As expected, growth of capital intensity increases productivity. The employees also seem to benefit from investments in the form of increased wages. The initial labor productivity level is negatively related to profitability and productivity growth indicating a catching-up or regression-towards-mean phenomenon (Friedman, 1992) . Its relation to wage growth is, however, positive. One explanation for this finding is that the employees are rewarded for the employer's performance via profit-sharing and similar schemes. The average initial wage level is negatively associated with wage growth. Interestingly, its relationship with profitability growth is positive. Foreign-owned companies have higher growth rates of profitability, productivity and wage than domestically-owned ones, but only the coefficient for wage growth is statistically significant. Consistently with various firm's life-cycle models, older firms have lower productivity growth. However, the same holds true for wage growth, leaving the profitability growth effect statistically insignificant.
22 While the staying and separating variables are primarily controls, it is interesting to note that having a large fraction of staying young educated workers in non-R&D occupations boost productivity and profitability (the young low-educated workers is the reference group here). Furthermore, we find that the separation of certain sub-groups of the older workers has a significant positive effect on productivity and profitability growth, implying that these workers were less productive and profitable than the average worker of the firm. 20 We also find that a higher share of staying older workers has a negative effect on productivity growth (the result for older R&D workers is statistically insignificant, however). 21
The most important and interesting finding can be read from the 5 th and 6 th rows of Table 3 : we find that hiring R&D workers from other firms has a positive effect on productivity, when they are hired to non-R&D occupations. The estimates also indicate that these workers are very highly paid but, even so, these recruitments are profitable to the company. These findings apply to both young and old workers. On the other hand, no statistically significant effects can be found when workers are hired to R&D occupations, irrespective of the source of these flows. 22
ROBUSTNESS
As a general remark, we wish to point out that the empirical setup employed in the previous section leads to conservative estimates, i.e. more likely to lead to statistically insignificant results rather than the opposite. From the outset firm-specific effects are removed and the setup is also robust to changes in firm structure. In addition, we control for the possible presence of industry and regional shocks as well as for a host of other factors that could influence profitability and productivity growth.
In this section we perform two robustness checks (cf . Table 4 ). First, we use a cut-off limit of 10 persons instead of the 20 persons cut-off point used in the baseline regressions in Section 5. With this adjustment our main finding that hiring former R&D workers to non-R&D occupations affects positively profitability remains statistically significant, albeit at a somewhat lower level. We attribute this to the fact that the measurement accuracy is substantially weaker among those additional 713 ( = 2,052 -1,339 ) firms employing 10-19
persons. 23 Second, in order to study the possible effects of outliers, we estimate a median regression of the model; also these regressions confirm our core finding. More precisely, we have tested whether productivity growth in our representative sample of Finnish firms was correlated with the hiring of workers that had worked in R&D departments in their previous employment, and whether or not any additional productivity performance due to the hiring of these workers was not captured by higher wages, i.e. resulted in higher profitability.
24
There is quite strong evidence of firm-to-firm knowledge spillovers but not of the most obvious type. Hiring workers from other R&D labs to one's own does not seem to be a statistically significant spillover channel, even if we do find weak support for it. 24 Hiring workers previously engaged in R&D to one's non-R&D activities, however, clearly boosts both productivity and profitability. This is interpreted as evidence that these workers transmit knowledge that can be readily copied and implemented without much additional R&D effort. Our findings also suggest that knowledge spillovers associated with R&D and channeled through inter-firm labor mobility may be partly, but are not fully, internalized by the labor market. Thus, inter-firm labor mobility is indeed found to be a channel of knowledge spillovers.
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first papers that isolates and estimates the performance effects of R&D-related knowledge spillovers transmitted through inter-firm labor mobility. Even if we study a specific type and transmission channel of spillovers, it
should not be taken as an indication that we see other types and channels any less important.
Our analysis was conducted at the level of the firm; an interesting avenue for further research would be to study the transmission of knowledge at the level of the employee. 
